|
|
|
Date of Arrival |
Place |
Date of Departure |
Orders,
Remarks etc |
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14.2.42 |
Sheerness |
16.2.42 |
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|
18.2.42 |
Scapa |
23.2.42 |
From FO 2nd
I/C Home Fleet: Proceed to pass Switha 2030 today Monday to rendezvous
PQ12 at 0800 24th in position 059 degs 10’ north, 007 degs
16’ west |
|
24.2.42 |
|
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From ACOS: PQ12 HM Ships
OFFA, ORIBI, GOSSAMER, STELLA, CAPELLA, NOTTS COUNTY ANGLE 060 degrees
15’ north 010 degrees 02’ west to Reykjavik. |
|
27.2.42 |
At sea |
|
27/2
GOSSAMER: Estimate 36
hours alongside repair ship to make good damage done.
From C in C Home Fleet:
HMS GOSSAMER’S 2252/27th. Convoy should not be delayed on
this account. Request you will sail HMS GOSSAMER to overtake. |
|
28.2.42 |
Iceland |
3.3.42 |
From ACIC:
Intend sailing PQ12 at 1200 1st March. Speed 7 knots. HMS
GOSSAMER to overtake when repaired.
From NOIC
Iceland:
HMS GOSSAMER sailed Reykjavik 2000 to overtake PQ12. M/S whalers Shusa,
Stefa, Svega and Shera sailed Seidisfjord 1400 to join PQ12 in
position K, 1734/3
PQ12 sailed
from
Reykjavik
on 1st March 1942. HMS GOSSAMER and five minesweeping whalers were to
have joined the convoy on the 4th, but, in the event, only two of the
whalers - one of which, Shera, later capsized in the Barents Sea owing
to the weight of ice on the upper deck - made the rendezvous. They
passed the convoy without sighting it. GOSSAMER and one whaler
proceeded independently to Murmansk, two of the whalers put back to
Iceland. |
|
6.3.42 |
|
|
From Admiralty: Tirpitz
sighted …off Frehavet at 1800/6 steering north. Attempt to attack
convoy PQ12 anticipated. |
|
7.3.42 |
|
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GOSSAMER encountered ice
070degs 53’ north 006degs 00’ east.
From HAZARD (in QP8) to
Admiralty: PQ12 met at 1200/7th course 57 escorted by HM
Ships Kenya, Oribi and OFFA. HMS GOSSAMER not seen. |
|
10.3.42 |
Kola Inlet |
29.4.42 |
10/3 2131 GOSSAMER
arrived Kola Inlet |
|
|
Convoys have been discharged without serious interference from air
attacks. The only raids of any importance were on the night of
15th-16th March and on 24th March. In the former, the bombs dropped
are said to have been 100 kilos. The jetty to which HMS Niger,
GOSSAMER and Hussar were hit and a shed blown to pieces, covering the
minesweepers with splinters and debris.
Source: ADM 199/1104 Report of SBNO North Russia |
|
21.3.42 |
At sea |
|
GOSSAMER, Hussar,
Harrier, Niger and Speedwell provided Eastern local escort for QP9
until 23/3. Ocean escort included Britomart and Sharpshooter.
|
|
28.3.42 |
PQ13
endured the full Arctic repertory of foul weather, and attacks by
enemy ships, submarines and aircraft... The Eastern Local Escort
consisting of the minesweepers GOSSAMER, Harrier, Hussar, Speedwell
had left Kola on 28th March to bring the convoy in and look for
survivors and stragglers.
That
evening Trinidad had to stop with salt in the boiler feed water. The
wind died, a full moon and a brilliant aurora lit up Trinidad as a
perfect target. She was only 70 miles from the Kola Inlet. She managed
to get going again and arrived at Kola on 30/3.
|
|
28.3.42 |
Source: ADM 199/347- Report of the Local Escort
From The Senior Officer, Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla
Date 9th April 1942 No. F.02/26
To The Commander in Chief, Home Fleet
Convoy PQ13
The following narrative of local escort while meeting PQ13 is
submitted. All times are zone minus three:-
1. Before leaving harbour, it was known that Convoy PQ13 was widely
scattered owing to gales and that S.S. "HARPALION" had been bombed.
2. H.M.Ships "HARRIER", "GOSSAMER", "SPEEDWELL" and "HUSSAR" sailed
at 1900 through position MU to 37ºE, carrying out an A/S patrol en
route.
3. At 2118 H.M.S."HUSSAR", who was keeping guard on 500 k/cs,
reported that the S.S."EMPIRE RANGER" was sinking in position 72º 13'N
32º 10ºE. As "EMPIRE RANGER" was apparently just ahead of the convoy
and, apart from other escorts in the vicinity of the convoy,
H.M.S."ORIBI" and two Russian destroyers from the Kola Inlet were
already on their way to join the convoy, it was decided that no useful
purpose could be served by detaching one of the Minesweepers (who at
the time were 180 miles away from the position in which "EMPIRE
RANGER" had been torpedoed).
|
|
29.3.42 |
4. Altered course at 0400 to North up longitude 37ºE. At 0500
"SPEEDWELL" was detached with orders to patrol between positions B and
Q and to escort the ships into Kola Inlet. If she met either "RIVER
AFTON" or "EMPIRE COWPER", she was to embark two officers and one
rating, to avoid their being incarcerated by the Russians, as had been
the experience a little before of three officers. It transpired later,
however, that one officer and the rating had sailed in the "EMPIRE
RANGER" and were, presumably, taken prisoner. The officer from "EMPIRE
COWPER" was collected by H.M.S."GOSSAMER" on return to Murmansk.
5. At 0645 a report was received of three German Destroyers in
position 71º 10'N, 31º 30'E at 2200 on 28th.
6. At 0600 and again at 0625, a Junkers 88 was sighted by
"SPEEDWELL" in the vicinity of position B and at 0730 a Junkers 88
circled "HARRIER", "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR".
7. "HARRIER", "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR" were to patrol latitude of
37º E between positions E and U; one of them was to be detached to
escort any unescorted stragglers met, returning to their patrol after
reaching Kola Inlet.
8. At 0632 orders were received from The Senior British Naval
Officer, North Russia that a minesweeper was to be detached to look
for boats from "EMPIRE RANGER" who had reported by W/T before
abandoning ship that they were making for the coast. As this
(Immediate) signal took nearly 12 hours to reach me and as by that
time there were three enemy Destroyers between the position of sinking
and the coast and it was known the H.M.S."ORIBI" and the two Russian
destroyers were near the position, I replied that it was not proposed
to detach a Minesweeper (the Minesweepers being some 120 miles away).
At 0825 orders were received from The Senior British Naval Officer,
North Russia to comply with his original signal, and accordingly
"HARRIER" was detailed and in latitude 71º 25' N at 0945 she increased
to full speed and steered up the convoy route in the hope of getting
news of "EMPIRE RANGER's" boats from any of the convoy or escorts met.
9. At 1054 signals were received which indicated a fight between
H.M.Ships "TRINIDAD", "FURY" and "ECLIPSE" and the enemy Destroyers.
Later one enemy Destroyer was reported stopped near the position where
"EMPIRE RANGER" was sunk.
10. At 1045 "HARRIER" encountered ice in latitude 71º 39'N. This
proved to be thick brash and "HARRIER" worked round to the Westward
and later to the South-Westward with some difficulty. The extent of
the ice was reported by W/T to The Senior British Naval Officer, North
Russia and to all escorts: also my intention of proceeding to escort
H.M.S."TRINIDAD" (who had reported that she had been torpedoed and was
about 50 miles to the North West of "HARRIER's" estimated position)
and the position, course and speed of S.S."HARPALION" who was met
about that time.
11. H.M.S."HUSSAR", who with H.M.S."GOSSAMER" had been left to
patrol the 37º meridian, sighted a submarine on the surface at 1046,
which was lost sight of shortly afterwards in a snow squall. At 11.48
"GOSSAMER" obtained an Asdic contact on what was quite probably the
same U-boat. Both ships carried out deliberate attacks and it appears
highly probable that the U-boat was destroyed.
Click
Here for detailed
report
12. At 1335 "GOSSAMER" detached "HUSSAR" to join "TRINIDAD" and
remained in the vicinity of the submarine till dark, when she resumed
patrol south of the ice.
13. H.M.S."SPEEDWELL", patrolling between positions B and U, had
attempted to intercept S.S."HARPALION" at position B but did not see
her. The next morning she left her patrol line in an endeavour to
escort "TRINIDAD", but in the very bad visibility failed to make
contact.
14. At 1625/29th "HARRIER" detected a ship by R.D.F. at a range of
11,000yards in a heavy snowstorm and shortly afterwards caught a
glimpse of H.M.S."FURY" who was escorting "TRINIDAD". "HARRIER" was at
first stationed on the beam of "TRINIDAD" to check her speed
(estimated then as 11 knots) and her compass. "TRINIDAD" was then
steering from aft and by magnetic compass. As "TRINIDAD''s" steering
appeared a little erratic, "HARRIER" took station ahead of her to make
good her course without zigzagging, while "ORIBI" and "FURY" screened
her on either bow.
15. At 1750 course was altered to 190º to make Kilbin North Bight.
It was arranged that W/T silence should not be broken to ask for D/F
Beacons and that the "HARRIER" should lead "TRINIDAD" into Kola Inlet
by using R.D.F. if necessary.
|
|
30.3.42 |
16. From about 0500 of 30th March the wind increased to Force 8 and
visibility was frequently nil owing to snowstorms. "TRINIDAD's" speed
varied from a maximum of 14 knots to a minimum of 4 during the night.
"FURY", whose R.D.F. was out of action, lost touch at about midnight
and "HARRIER" was unable to detect her by R.D.F. and therefore unable
to lead "TRINIDAD" over to "FURY" as had been ordered by "TRINIDAD".
At about 0500, "TRINIDAD's" speed was 4-5 knots and for half
an hour or so "ORIBI" and "HARRIER" carried out an endless chain
patrol around her.
17. At 0752 "TRINIDAD" broached to and told "HARRIER" to try to get
a wire in to her. By the time "HARRIER" had turned and got back to
her, however, "TRINIDAD" was able to resume her course. Tugs, all
available A/S escorts and fighter cover were asked for by W/T, as
"TRINIDAD" had great difficulty in keeping steam.
18. 0800. Made Kildin Island. Entrance to Kola Inlet was obscured
by snowstorms and "HARRIER" passed in positions obtained by R.D.F.
19. At 12.00 when inside Kola Inlet "HARRIER" and "ORIBI" resumed
patrol, making for position Q. They were joined at 1500 by
"SPEEDWELL".
"ORIBI" informed me by signal that he had found "EMPIRE
RANGER's" boats at 0840/29th in position 72º 00' N 31º 11'E, showing
every sign that the occupants had abandoned them. There were food,
drink and blankets in the boats, so it appears that the men were
picked up by some other ship. As no ship in the convoy or escort has
since reported having picked them up, as German Destroyers were in the
vicinity and as the German wireless has claimed prisoners from a
merchant ship, their fate appears obvious.
20. At 0550 "GOSSAMER" had intercepted the signal giving
"TRINIDAD's" position, course and speed and, having no merchant ships
in sight, altered to the Westward to join her.
21. At 0745 the visibility in her vicinity had cleared to 7 miles
and "GOSSAMER" sighted a submarine on the surface almost 5 miles ahead
and three merchant ships at extreme visibility on her starboard
quarter. "GOSSAMER" chased the submarine at full speed but the
submarine drew away and, after half an hour's chase, "GOSSAMER" shaped
a course to join the merchantmen. These ships were "SCOTTISH
AMERICAN", "EFFINGHAM" and "DUNBOYNE".
22. At 1020 "GOSSAMER" received instruction from The Senior British
Naval Officer, North Russia to proceed immediately to the assistance
of "INDUNA", torpedoed in position 70º 55'N 37º 18'E. Search by
daylight and during the night proved ineffective, and patrol was
resumed the next morning.
23. ?045 "HUSSAR", not having succeeded in making contact with
"TRINIDAD", came up with 9 ships of PQ13 and the Whaler ????? [???? =
indistinct text in original document] escorted by two Russian
destroyers (without Asdics) ??????? A/S trawler (whose A/S was out of
action). She escorted ?????? Kola Inlet and, as the Acting Commodore
in "SCOTTISH ??????" had no charts of the Inlet, led them to Bolshoi
Oleni ?????? where they arrived at 2130. When off Toros Island an
?????? aircraft dropped bombs; there were no hits. At 2200 ??????
resumed patrol.
24. 1900 "ORIBI" sighted a Whaler ahead, roughly in Position
?????? "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" closed the Whaler who proved to be
Silja and was wallowing, without fuel in a sea 54. "ORIBI" ????? to
the assistance of "RIVER AFTON" who had reported ??????? by a U-boat.
25. While "HARRIER" was getting "SILJA" in tow, "SPEEDWELL"
patrolled round the two ships to provide an A/S screen and then ??????
ahead when "HARRIER" with "SILJA" in tow made good ?????? and speed of
5 knots. The wind was then North- ??????, Force 7, almost astern.
|
|
31.3.42 |
26. "HUSSAR" joined at 0230 and screened astern. Kola Inlet ???? at
08.30 again in very bad visibility owing to snow. "SPEEDWELL" had by
then lost touch, and "HUSSAR" was ordered ???? patrol through
positions Q and B.
27. 10.10 "HARRIER" anchored off the South-East entrance to ??????
Harbour and got "SILJA" alongside to give her 5 tons ????? "HARRIER"
making good an engine defect and repairing ?????.
28. The Captain of the "SILJA" told me that when the "BALLOT"
?????, her Master told him to take off half the crew. ?????? wisely
said he would do so, provided they came by boat, ???? were an odd
collection and the situation had the makings ????? stampede. "SILJA"
later transferred these 40 or so med ????? "INDUNA" who was herself
sunk. Survivors from "INDUNA" ????? (who reached harbour safely) have
since been picked ????? inshore, by Russian patrols.
29. 1230 "SPEEDWELL", who had been patrolling in the vicinity of
the entrance to the Inlet, hove to in sight, and at 1245, tugs ?????
taken over "SILJA", "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" set a course ????
intending to proceed on the reciprocal course to that on ???? the main
body of the convoy had approached the evening ????? it being known
that "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR" were ???? between positions Q and B and
the ice limit south of U.
30. 1650 an object was sighted by "SPEEDWELL" (who was on ?????
port bow 7 cables) bearing North. The investigation ?????? to be a red
sail. The Master, Chief Officer, two ???? Officers and thirteen men
from the American S.S. "EFFINGHAM" ?????? picked up by "HARRIER". From
them it was learnt that their ????? had been torpedoed in Position 70º
28'N 35º 44'E at 1100.
This information, and the "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" were
searching for a second boat from the "EFFINGHAM", was passed by W/T to
The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia. This signal crossed
one from the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia ordering all
minesweepers to return to harbour and fuel unless in company with a
merchant ship. The search was continued until 0740 of 1st April in
generally good conditions of visibility. It was then abandoned, as I
considered that the missing boat, if still afloat, must be inshore. It
was subsequently learned that the second boat was picked up in the
Kola Inlet p.m. 31st and that the 14 occupants are doing well.
When picked up after 32 hours, the survivors from the
"EFFINGHAM" were, with one exception, in remarkably good fettle. I was
particularly impressed by the bearing of the Chief Officer and have
forwarded a recommendation for him through the Senior British Naval
Officer, North Russia. They had buried five men (having previously
removed their clothes for their own use) not long before we sighted
them, and one of their company, in spite of the unremitting efforts of
Surgeon Lieutenant Ian Mankelly, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and of
Henry J Woodward, L.S.B.A. C/MX52544, died two hours after being
brought onboard and was buried at sea that night, a funeral service
having been conducted in the Sick Bay. Most of the survivors were
suffering from frostbite and were a bit restless, and the Doctor and
the L.S.B.A. tended them throughout the night. This is by no means the
first occasion on which this officer and this rating have worked
tirelessly, cheerfully and with undoubted skill under trying
conditions.
|
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1.4.42 |
31. "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR" returned to harbour a.m. and "HARRIER"
and "SPEEDWELL" p.m. 1st April, "NIGER", who had been boiler-cleaning
and repairing Gyro Compass sailed a.m. to search for the Whaler
"SULLA". At 1045 she saw three torpedoes approaching an the surface
from the port quarter. Two were going to pass ahead, but the third
which was expected to pass astern was zigzagging, and the necessary
avoiding action was taken. "NIGER" proceeded at full speed down the
torpedo tracks. a good contact was obtained on the Starboard bow and a
counter attack was made. By a great misfortune, "NIGER'S" Asdic Dome
was leaking slightly, with the result that echoes went woolly within
20º on either bow. Nevertheless the attacks carried out were good and
may have damaged the submarine, since they were made in broad daylight
and the submarine's original firing position was definitely
established at the end of the torpedo tracks which were very plain in
a calm flat sea. A search was carried out for several hours afterwards
and no further contact was obtained.
32. Having failed to find "SULLA", "NIGER" returned to harbour p.m.
3rd April.
33. Convoy PQ13, the Ocean Escort and the Covering Force had a
strenuous time indeed, competing as they did with gales, surface,
submarine, and air attack, ice and frequent snowstorms (although the
last mentioned were probably an advantage at times), and the way in
which they won through is worthy of admiration.
34. At the same time I submit that, to a much lesser degree and for
a much shorter period, the Local Escort had a non-stop performance and
I would like to pay tribute to the way in which Officers and men of
H.M.Ships "HARRIER", "NIGER", "GOSSAMER", "SPEEDWELL" AND "HUSSAR"
carried out their duties on this occasion. The receipt of the
following signal kindly sent by The Senior British Naval Officer,
North Russia on return to harbour was greatly appreciated by all
ships:-
M.S.6 From S.B.N.O., N.R.
I
should like Commanding Officers of all Minesweepers to know that I
fully appreciate the good work in the difficult conditions in the past
few days searching, escorting, and hunting under the nose of the enemy
sea and air forces. It does everyone, but especially the Engine room
department, great credit that all ships have been ready for service
whenever called upon and I am sure that valuable lives and ships have
been saved by the good work performed.
Commander
Senior Officer, Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla
1742A/1 |
|
Extract from ADM 199/1104 Report of SBNO North Russia March 1942
I
wish to pay tribute to the recent work of the Minesweeping Flotilla,
consisting of HMS Harrier (Senior Officer), Niger, GOSSAMER, Speedwell
and Hussar, under the command of Commander E P Hinton, DSO, MVC,
Senior Officer, 6th Minesweeping Flotilla. These ships have
been escorting QP and PQ Convoys in most severe weather conditions and
expected every form of attack be the enemy at distances up to 300
miles from the base. They have little rest except when cleaning
boilers, and can seldom berth alongside or obtain relaxation. Their
work, especially when meeting convoy PQ13, has been extremely well
done and reflects credit on all concerned.
Signed N Bevan
Rear Admiral, Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia
Polyarnoe, 1942
|
|
10.4.42 |
Harrier, Hussar and
GOSSAMER formed part of the Eastern local escort for QP10 (16 ships)
as far as 30°E on 12/4. Speedwell was part of the Ocean escort. The
convoy was heavily attacked by aircraft and submarines during the
first few days.
|
|
18.4.42 |
Niger, Hussar, GOSSAMER
and Harrier joined PQ14 as eastern local escort and a strong gale from
the north-west sprang up. The convoy arrived Murmansk 19/4 where there
were persistent air attacks.
|
|
28.4.42 |
Niger, Hussar, GOSSAMER
and Harrier joined QP11 (13 ships) from Murmansk as eastern local
escort until 29/4. They escorted the convoy for the first 300 miles
and then returned to Murmansk.
|
|
1.5.42 |
Following the torpedoing
of HMS Edinburgh by U456, Niger, Hussar, GOSSAMER and Harrier were
sent to reinforce the protective screen of destroyers while the
Russian tug Rubin took her in tow. Just before midnight with the sun
touching the horizon and immediately rising again, the minesweepers
hove into sight. It was found that the tug could not tow the big ship
on her own, so two tows were secured. Rubin on the port and GOSSAMER
on the port quarter. Even so, they could only make 2 knots. Edinburgh
signalled to the minesweepers that ...’ in the event of attack by
German destroyers...(they)...are to act independently, retiring under
smoke if necessary’.
|
|
2.5.42 |
By 0530 with the
destroyers Forester and Foresight on either beam and Harrier, Niger
and Hussar astern, Edinburgh proceeded steadily. Intermittent snow
showers varied the visibility from two to eight miles.
At 0627 Hussar, on
Edinburgh’s starboard quarter, came under fire from three German
destroyers trying to close through the fog on Edinburgh. Hussar took
up the challenge with a spirited and gallant resistance to the enemy.
She immediately opened fire with her 4 inch gun. Fire was returned
immediately, straddling the tiny sweeper which, outgunned and
outmanoeuvred, fell back towards Edinburgh.
Immediately Harrier and
the two destroyers swung round and headed towards the gun flashes.
These aggressive tactics by the destroyers and 3 minesweepers kept
them at bay. Edinburgh ordered GOSSAMER to cast off and, steaming in
circles out of control, opened fire, hitting one of the German ships.
GOSSAMER and Harrier closed in on Hussar and Edinburgh, their Asdics
searching for submarines. Unfortunately at 0730 a German torpedo
attack on one of the British destroyers missed but went on to hit
Edinburgh.
Able Seaman Colin Kennedy Page was an ASDIC operator on GOSSAMER
and his son, Mark Page, reports that 'He
was on the ship when she assisted the Edinburgh, and told tales of
helping my uncle (who was an officer on the Edinburgh) onto the
Gossamer. He also said that the heard the final torpedo through
the earphones, as it missed the Gossamer by a fraction before
hitting the Edinburgh. He told me that there was a print out of
the sound of the torpedo, and he intended to keep it (to assist
him as a raconteur) but lost it in the sinking.'
With both of the destroyers badly damaged, time and again
the minesweepers darted forward firing their guns. Admiral Bonham
Carter described the minesweepers actions as ‘like three young
terriers, going in and firing when they could’. Almost unbelievably
the minesweepers’ valiant action in the cloud and flame of battle led
the enemy to suppose they were destroyers arriving to supplement the
British force and probably restrained them from mounting further
attacks. In reality there was nothing but the small group of
minesweepers to stop the Germans from annihilating every British ship
opposing them.
Edinburgh was listing at
17 degrees and starting to settle. With Hussar making a smoke screen,
GOSSAMER was ordered along the starboard side to take off the wounded
and merchant navy personnel being taken home. The transfer of the
wounded from a sloping deck onto the minesweeper’s deck 12 feet below
was a difficult task. The passengers included many Poles released from
Russian prisoner of war camps, army and RAF instructors, and Czechs
who had been interned in Russia. She embarked 440 officers and men
while Edinburgh continued firing at the German ships. At 0800 the
order to abandon ship was given and the remaining 350 crew were
transferred to Harrier on the port side. Captain Hinton and the crew
of Harrier showed remarkable calmness for the minesweeper was in
danger of being crushed as Edinburgh increased her list. He signalled
to Edinburgh ‘You are leaning on me rather heavily’. Meanwhile the tug
Rubin came rushing in and unfortunately collided with Harrier with a
resounding crack, causing little damage.
 HMS
Harrier alongside HMS Edinburgh
Aboard both minesweepers
the decks were becoming so overcrowded there was imminent danger of
the vessels capsizing. Although the men were asked to go below to
stabilise the vessel a large number were reluctant to do so. It was
understandable in the circumstances, especially for those who had
recently been trapped below decks. Edinburgh’s First Lieutenant called
on the men to follow him and led the way as far down as it was
possible to go. Finally, Rear Admiral Bonham Carter hoisted his flag
on Harrier. As they laid off Edinburgh, Harrier fired 20 rounds of
semi-armour piercing shells into her with little obvious effect except
that two fires were started. Two patterns of depth charges were then
dropped close alongside but this was also unsuccessful. At this stage
the survivors nearly panicked because they had not been warned what
was going on and thought they were under attack again. Finally a
torpedo from Foresight sank her.
The laden sweepers
(GOSSAMER was carrying 440 extra officers and men but in 1940 on one
trip from Dunkirk she had somehow managed to carry 845), with the
Rubin and the damaged destroyers Foresight and Forester, set course
for Kola Inlet. At 1020 Niger, which had been detached in the night to
locate and bring in the two refuelled Russian destroyers, rejoined.
|
|
5.5.42 |
Harrier, GOSSAMER,
Hussar, Niger and the other ships arrived at Kola. Edinburgh’s
survivors were disembarked at Polyarnoe where they were split into two
groups with one group being re-embarked on GOSSAMER for Vaenga. The
minesweepers stopped at Vaenga to refuel. |
Soon after arriving at
Murmansk Harrier’s Commanding Officer received the following letter
from the captain of the Russian tug Rubin, which was greatly
appreciated by everyone:
Dear Sir,
Soviet seaman has witness
of heroic battle English seaman with predominants powers of enemy.
English seamen did observe their sacred duty before Fatherland. We are
prouding to staunchness and courage of British seamens – our Allies. I
am very sorry what injured your ship by approach to board for what I
must beg pardon.
Commander of Division
Disembarking at Murmansk,
Admiral Bonham Carter sent the following message to the captain and
crew of Harrier:
...it was inspiring to
see the minesweepers staying on the scene of action and taking every
opportunity of firing at the enemy when visibility permitted. The
manner in which Harrier and GOSSAMER were brought alongside the
listing Edinburgh during the action showed a fine feat of seamanship
and I fully confirm the Commanding Officer of Edinburgh’s report of
the way we were treated on board. Never have I seen more kindness and
attention than was given to myself, Captain, officers and men than by
the Captain, officers and ship’s company of Harrier in which we left.
A day or two after
arriving in the Kola Inlet, Harrier entertained Rear-Admiral
Bonham-Carter in the small wardroom. Christopher McLean recalls that
at the end of the evening he thanked them very much for their
hospitality and for all the help they had given in the Edinburgh
action. He had no way of reciprocating but wondered whether they had
ever seen an admiral stand on his head. This he proceeded to do much
to the delight and astonishment of his audience.
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Source: ADM116/4544 Convoys to Russia March to May 1942
Recommendation for Awards
Lieutenant Commander Thomas Crosbie Crease RN HMS GOSSAMER
During the action in which HMS Edinburgh was sunk, Lt Commander Crease
without the slightest hesitation took his ship into action against the
more heavily armed attacking force and engaged the enemy wherever
possible. When ordered to bring his ship alongside HMS Edinburgh's
high side, a manoeuvre which he executed with great skill while the
action was still in progress and did not leave until his ship was
filled to capacity.
DSM - AB Henry James Woodward J104237
Carried out his duties as gunlayer of the starboard oerlikon with
marked coolness and skill. He was one of the only gunlayers in the
escort to engage the first aircraft to attack. This aircraft retired
with one engine out of action, flying low, and jettisoned the
remainder of its bombs. He repeatedly hit a second aircraft and
obtained certain hits on two others. His accurate gunfire was largely
responsible for the fact that air attacks on the convoy were less well
pressed home and heavy casualties thereby avoided.
Mention in Despatches:
Lt Frank Alexander John Andrew
This officer's resourcefulness, cheerfulness and cool efficiency
throughout was mainly responsible for the embarkation of 440 officers
and men.
Sub Lt Gerald Benjamin Kenyon RNVR
When alongside HMS Edinburgh the bow wire carried away with the swell,
and the fore spring appeared in danger of parting at any moment.
Without hesitation and at considerable personal risk this officer and
a leading seaman climbed onboard HMS Edinburgh and secured a new
wire.
Leading Seaman Jack Francis Case P/JX 137794
When alongside HMS Edinburgh the bow wire carried away with the swell,
and the fore spring appeared in danger of parting at any moment.
Without hesitation and at considerable personal risk an officer and
this rating climbed onboard HMS Edinburgh and secured a new wire.
Leading Seaman John Baillie P/SSX 200093
Much of the credit for the rapid embarkation of survivors is
attributable to the good work of this leading seaman.
YS Ronald Frederick William Winter P/JX136084
Communications were kept at a high degree of efficiency throughout by
the leadership and example of this yeoman.
AB Walter Everett, J100186
Carried out his duties as gunlayer of the starboard Oerlikon with
marked coolness and skill. He was one of the only gunlayers in the
escort to engage the first aircraft to attack. This aircraft retired
with one engine out of action, flying low, and jettisoned the
remainder of its bombs. Everett obtained certain hits on two more
aircraft. His accurate gunfire was largely responsible for the fact
that air attacks on the convoy were less well pressed home and heavy
casualties thereby avoided.
AB Reginald Patrick Oliver Bell SSX23660
Carried out his duties as gunlayer of the starboard 0.5 gun with
marked coolness and skill. He repeatedly hit an aircraft which crashed
into the sea 200 yards from GOSSAMER, and obtained certain hits on
another. His accurate gunfire was largely responsible for the fact
that air attacks on the convoy were less well pressed home and heavy
casualties thereby avoided.
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10.5.42 |
Kola Inlet |
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From SBNO N
Russia: Arrival Kola Inlet HMS GOSSAMER |
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21.5.42 |
At sea |
23.5.42 |
Eastern
Local Escort for QP12 (17 ships) comprised Bramble, GOSSAMER, Leda,
Seagull and two Russian Destroyers. Harrier was part of the ocean
escort arriving Reykjavik 29/5 without incident. |
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29.5.42 |
On the
evening of the 29th, 140 miles NE of the Kola Inlet,
Captain Crombie commanding the 1st MSF based at Kola joined
PQ16 in HMS Bramble, together with Leda, Seagull, Niger, Hussar and
GOSSAMER. The convoy divided and at 2330 Crombie’s section, escorting
six of the merchant ships to Archangel, was attacked by 15 Ju88’s
while 18 attacked the Murmansk-bound ships.
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30.5.42 |
Crombie’s division,
proceeding in line ahead and led by the Empire Elgar, arrived at the
estuary of the Dvina on 30/5 where it met the ice breaker Stalin. They
began a passage through the ice lasting 40 hours. Confined to the
narrow lead cut by the Stalin, they were attacked by Ju87 Stukas in a
noisy but useless attack. This section of PQ16 passed Archangel and
secured alongside at Bakarista, a new wharf two miles upstream.
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Commander Onslow, Senior
Officer close escort reported that four fifths of the convoy had got
through.... ‘due to the gallantry, efficiency and tireless zeal of
the officers and men of the escorts and to the remarkable courage and
determination of those of the merchant vessels. No praise can be too
high for either’.
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31.5.42 |
Kola Inlet |
? |
24/6 GOSSAMER sunk by a
direct bomb hit during an air attack while at anchor in the Kola
Inlet. Three officers were killed and 20 ratings missing, twelve were
wounded . |
Source: ADM1/12285 Enemy
air attack on HMS GOSSAMER while acting as an escort to North Russian
Convoy, June 1942
Polyarnoe Base
26th
June 1942
To: The Senior British
Naval Officer, North Russia
Sir,
1.
I have the honour to
report the circumstances under which HMS GOSSAMER was sunk on 24th
June 1942.
2.
The ship was anchored in
position 005 degrees Mishukov Light, 5 cables in 13 fathoms of water.
The weather was sunny with no wind or cloud. The tide was slack. There
was a slight haze at about 5,000 feet.
3.
At about 0900C a RED air
raid warning was received, and all guns’ crews were closed up.
Watertight doors and scuttles had been closed during a RED warning
about 0800C and left closed. About 0908C five Junkers 88 aircraft were
seen to the southward flying from west to east through the slight
haze. As they reached the sun, four turned towards the merchant ships
anchored at Mishkoz and began to dive. The fifth was lost sight of in
the sun.
4.
‘A’ gun and Oerlikons
engaged the four aircraft during their attack on the merchant vessels
and were in action when GOSSAMER was hit at 0912C. The range was too
great for 0.5-inch or Lewis guns.
5.
From the account given by
the Commanding Officer, HMS Hussar, it appears that the fifth aircraft
parted company with the remainder and made a direct attack on
GOSSAMER. Although this fifth aircraft was known to be unaccounted for
and lookouts, officers, signalmen and disengaged guns’ crews were
trying to pick it up, the only man who saw anything was the starboard
Lewis gunner who observed two bombs in the sun when they were a few
hundred feet from the ship. There were nine sun glasses and two pairs
of sun goggles in use distributed about the ship beside binoculars
fitted with shades.
6.
One (or two) bombs struck
the ship slightly on the starboard side of the centre line between the
minesweeping winch and the wardroom. The whole of the stern portion of
the ship abaft the wardroom was practically severed from the remainder
of the ship and the ship began to settle by her stern. Hussar was
signalled to stand by. The port whaler was lowered to the upper deck
and the wounded were put in the boat. Such floats and rafts as
remained were got over the side. The order was then passed to abandon
ship but, almost immediately, the ship began to turn over slowly to
starboard. The order was then passed ‘Every man for himself, get clear
of the ship’. The ship turned over at 0921C, or eight minutes after
being hit.
7.
Of the three officers and
twenty ratings who were not recovered, it is estimated that some
fifteen were killed as a direct result of the explosion. These
included Oerlikon guns’ crews, Wardroom Officers and stewards. Some
six are estimated to have died in the water, either becoming trapped
when the ship turned over or through being weak swimmers. The only two
wounded men it was not possible to get away would undoubtedly have
died anyhow, the one with a shattered spine and the other with a very
severe chest wound and two broken legs. It is perhaps worthy of note
that men who were lying down even quite near the explosion were,
generally speaking, unhurt, whereas those standing up were completely
flattened against the next bulkhead.
8.
The prompt action of some
three or four Russian power boats and at least one rowing boat was
responsible for saving a number of lives. HMS Hussar was very quickly
away and on the spot, taking survivors onboard from all Russian boats.
9.
The behaviour of the
officers and ship’s company throughout was entirely in accordance with
the highest traditions of the service. Attached as an Appendix to this
report are the names to which I should like to draw your particular
attention.
I have the honour to be
sir, your obedient servant
Lieutenant Commander
Crease
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Recommendations for
operational awards to ratings of HMS GOSSAMER:
PERRY John, Petty
Officer,
Official Number not known. (Posthumous)
After the explosion this
Petty Officer took charge below decks ensuring that there should be no
rush for the one remaining after hatch. He then saved the life of a
stoker by extricating him from a pile of debris and getting him to the
upper deck. He was last seen in the water encouraging the weaker
swimmers. He himself was not saved.
HOLDEN Edward Sydney
Farr, MX 64698,
Sick Berth Attendant
McLEAN Archibald,
MX 60416, ERA III
These two men at great
personal risk extricated a badly wounded able seaman from the debris
in the after part of the ship just before this part of the ship became
submerged and got him safely into the whaler.
BIRD Arthur Edward,
M30181, Chief ERA
ELKS George Earnest,
JX 236417, Able Seaman
FOSTER George Campbell,
JX 153809, Petty Officer
After the engine room had
been cleared, these three men returned below with the ship settling
and listing rapidly, at great risk to themselves, and worked until
just before she capsized to try to get the steam electric generator on
the board.
BEALE Sydney Martin
Chichester, JX
296483, Ordinary Seaman
PAGE Colin Kennedy,
SSX 18160, Able Seaman
Having themselves only
just got out of very cold water into boats, each of these men dived in
again without hesitation to drag a man in difficulties into their
respective boats. There is no doubt that both were responsible for
saving a man’s life.
The Honours and Awards
Committee has carefully considered the services of Officers and Men of
HMS GOSSAMER, and submits that the King’s approval be sought for the
awards set forth below.
Great gallantry was shown
by members of the ship’s company after she had been hit by bombs while
acting as part of the escort to a North Russian convoy.
In addition to the Awards
submitted, it is proposed to refer the gallantry in rescue work of
Ordinary Seaman Beale and Able Seaman Page to the Royal Humane Society
British Empire Medal
SBA Edward Sydney Farr
Holden
ERA III Archibald McLean
Mention in Despatches
(Posthumous)
Petty Officer John Perry
Mention in Despatches
CERA Arthur Edward Bird
B George Earnest Elks
PO George Campbell Foster
[Published in London
Gazette No 35815 of 4th December 1942]
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Source:
Private papers of Lt R M Milligan RCNVR - IWM 500 88/55/1
Between
convoys we (HMS Hussar) anchored in a smallish bay which we
called Stuka Alley as they came our way quite often. It was
standard practice for a Jerry to come over high up at about 0800
each day to photograph all and sundry. Kodak Party he was
called. Then around 1400 the stukas, having picked the best
pictures, came in and did their stuff. We were selected one
sunny afternoon as we lay at anchor.
Our man
dropped his too late, our Oerlikon shots too far behind, but
they got Gossamer. Bomb went in between the sweep rail and the
wardroom, blew her bottom out and the deck off along with my
opposite number. She rolled over and gradually sank slowed up
somewhat as a Russian barge alongside held her up until she went
too. Chiefy had our steam up in ten minutes, a record, and we
were there just after she went, picking up survivors. I do not
know how many there was but our wardroom was full of wounded.
Being our chummy ship it meant a lot to our chaps. When I say
chummy it had started long before I joined Hussar as they had
worked together a lot.
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The survivors from HMS Gossamer had to undergo a further attack as
they returned to the UK onboard HMS Marne.
In her
action with surface forces on August 25, when returning to the
United Kingdom with survivors from H.M.Ss. Edinburgh and
Gossamer, H.M.S. Marne suffered 3 men killed and 5
wounded by shell splinters. These wounded had to be kept on
board. The report of her Medical Officer recorded that:
'It
was necessary to excise major wounds under local anaesthesia as
they were very dirty with clothing, splinters and pieces of skin
carried deep into the tissues. Dressings were sterilised by
baking them in cigarette tins in the galley oven, and they
proved very satisfactory. As the ship was rolling considerably,
the deck itself proved to be the best instrument table.
Operating was carried on at speed as the ship was still in very
dangerous waters.'
The
conditions on board the
Marne
were even more complicated by
the twin guns which were mounted above the sick bay, so that
much dust and smoke found its way into the atmosphere during the
course of any surgical procedure. This ship had also been short
of food for the preceding fortnight, and this fact also made her
Medical Officer fear that the resistance to infection of his
casualties might be lowered. However, this did not prove to be
the case, and all these men were apyrexial with their wounds
clean, when transferred to the Hospital Ship Amarapoora
at Scapa Flow.
Source:
The Royal Naval Medical Services Vol II, JLS Coulter
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