Source: ADM 1/10785
Report of HMS
Boreas
1150, 3rd Feb 1940:
When on A/S patrol in the vicinity of Troup Head I intercepted a
signal from HMS Speedwell saying that HMS
SPHINX had been badly damaged by a bomb 15 miles 000°
from Kinnaird Head. With HMS Brazen I
proceeded to see if I could be of assistance.
1330 3rd Feb 1940:
In touch with HMS Speedwell.
HMS Boreas and HMS Brazen carried out
A/S screening while Skipjack took SPHINX
in tow.
1530 3rd Feb 1940:
HMS SPHINX in tow. HMS
Boreas screening from starboard side and HMS
Brazen from port.
1900 3rd Feb 1940:
HMS Speedwell’s 18.19 and
1900 were my first intimation that there were any doubts about the
ultimate safety of HMS SPHINX.
Conditions at the time were extremely
unpleasant. The night was very dark and I knew that HMS
Harrier was somewhere in the vicinity but not her position. Wind
was of gale force and the sea was rapidly becoming very rough. Asdics were
useless. As I had no information I made to Speedwell
‘ Can destroyers be of any further assistance or shall they
resume their patrol’. No answer was received to this. Still without
information I made to Speedwell ‘What is
situation ?’ and received the reply ‘Tow has parted’.
I received from Speedwell
‘Stand by SPHINX abandoning ship
now’.
I closed
SPHINX at
16 knots and saw Speedwell attempt to get
alongside. He made to me ‘Are you going alongside?’, to which I
replied ‘Yes’ and between 0330 and the time that SPHINX
turned over I went alongside 3 times and took off 7 men.
On the first two occasions I only took
off one man each time but on the third succeeded in getting 5. The sea at
the time was very heavy, SPHINX had a big
list to starboard and the men to start with were very reluctant to jump
for my forecastle which I estimate was moving up and down some 15 feet. On
the second occasion I sustained some slight damage to my bow.
On the second and third times of going
alongside a line was got into SPHINX and on
the third attempt an effort was made to float a Carley raft between the
ships but under the weather conditions then prevailing I could not hold Boreas
up into the wind so we drifted too far apart.
I made a signal abandoning the Carley
raft idea and saying that I was coming alongside again. Having turned I
found that SPHINX had foundered I went to
windward of the largest group of men that I could see and drifted down on
them. By 05.15 I had picked up 30. One man subsequently died. As far as I
know only two men of those I had alongside were not picked up, one of whom
was SPHINX’s Coxswain. They were alongside
for a short time about 0500 and then drifted astern. I think that they
were both dead at that time.
I cannot speak too highly of the way
all my ship’s company worked to save these men. Conditions were as bad
as could be imagined, it was very dark, the ship was rolling anything up
to 40° either side and
heavy seas and the cold made rescue work very difficult. That only two men
should not have been got inboard reflects credit on the men engaged on
this operation. Many men at considerable risk went over the side on
bowlines to pass lines around the men in the sea as the only way to get
them on board.
I had drifted out of the area in which
survivors were floating and as there were other ships available for
searching considered that to get a doctor was the next essential. This was
not actually possible until 0945. The work of the Coxswain during this
time, Acting Chief Petty Officer B F Lambden P/J 115355 in connection with
men suffering from injuries and exposure was most meritorious.
All this time Brazen
was maintaining an A/S patrol. Brazen was
temporarily under the command of Lieutenant G V
Corbett. At about 1800 he
had received a signal from Speedwell
instructing him to stand by to take SPHINX in
tow so he had got a shackle and cable aft.
After this he received no signal at all until I told him to join me
at 0550. I deliberately had not informed him of developments after 0310 as
conditions for going alongside were not suitable for an entirely
inexperienced Commanding Officer. From 0430 onwards I considered that
there were sufficient ships to have picked up survivors who had not
drowned without another coming on an unfamiliar scene.
I consider that the Commanding Officer
of Brazen did correctly when he did not close
the remainder of the ships during the night. He had no intimation that
SPHINX
had foundered and he had appreciated that the other ships present were
sufficient to deal with any other eventuality.
Lieutenant Commander
Commanding Officer
HMS Boreas
