DATE OF ARRIVAL

LOCATION

DATE OF DEPARTURE

ORDERS, REMARKS ETC

10.1.40

Clyde

?

9/1 from N O i/c Belfast: GLEANER can be taken in hand for refit 17/1

12/1 From N O i/c Belfast: GLEANER taken in hand 13/1. Anticipate date of completion 27/1

?

Belfast

6.2.40

8.2.40

Greenock

?

11.2.40

Source: Enigma - The Battle for the Code, Hugh Sebag-Montefiore 

Sinking of U33 and capture of Enigma machine rotors 

The U33 had left Wilhelmshaven on 5th February 1940 under Kapitanleutnant Hans Von Dresky and a crew of forty. Her daring, almost suicidal task, which had been ordered by Hitler himself, was to lay mines in one of the Allies most valuable seaways, the River Clyde. Karl Dönitz himself visited Wilhelmshaven to see the U-boat off.
 

 

 

THE FIRST CAPTURE 

.....During the early hours of Sunday 11 February 1940 Dresky told Schilling his plan. He wanted to be in a good mine‑laying position within the estuary before the sun came up. Then he planned to submerge and settle the U‑boat on the sea bed until the evening when he hoped it would be safe to come to the surface again. After laying the mines during Sunday night and Monday morning, he hoped to escape to the relative safety of the Atlantic before dawn on Tuesday 13 February. But before any mines could be laid, Dresky's well thought out plan began to go wrong.

12.2.40

The U‑33 was chugging along on the surface during the early hours of Monday 12 February, when the four lookouts on the bridge spotted a mysterious silhouette coming towards them out of the darkness. It was a ship travelling in the opposite direction to the U‑boat. Fortunately for the Germans, the blacked‑out vessel passed the U‑boat some distance away. Nevertheless the lookouts on the bridge held their breath as they and Dresky watched it steam past. 

Shortly after this Schilling climbed the ladder inside the conning tower to talk to Dresky on the bridge. He could not have arrived at a worse moment. For Schilling was just in time to see what he took to be a British destroyer coming towards them. Seconds later Dresky shouted out, 'Alarm', and he and all the lookouts jumped down the conning tower, as the U‑boat lurched forward into an emergency dive. The British ship which Schilling had spotted was not a destroyer. It was HMS GLEANER, a converted survey ship in Britain's anti‑submarine fleet. It was the same ship which had sailed past the U‑boat shortly before. No one on GLEANER had seen the U‑33 when the two ships had passed each other for the first time. But at about 2.50 a.m. on 12 February GLEANER'S hydrophone set operator heard a suspicious noise which sounded to him like a diesel engine. The tonk-tonk‑tonk noises were occurring at the rate of two tonks per second. GLEANER'S commander, Lieutenant‑Commander Hugh Price, and the officer on duty on GLEANER'S bridge swiftly gave the order for the ship to be turned around. As the range between the two vessels lessened, GLEANER'S searchlights were switched on and the British lookouts caught sight of a white object which, they said, could have been the spray made by a periscope gliding through the water. It quickly disappeared. But by this time, GLEANER'S asdic sonar equipment had locked onto the U‑33. At 3.53 a.m. the British ship dropped its first pattern of depth charges. 

At this point everyone inside the U‑boat should have been working as a well co‑ordinated team. The men in the central control room, the nerve centre of the submarine, where most of the instruments and the periscopes were located, should have been watching the commander and should have been ready to obey his every order. But on the U‑33, the dissension which had been bubbling beneath the surface quickly made itself known. When Schilling asked how deep they should dive, Dresky had indicated about forty metres. This was not to the helmsman's satisfaction at all. He wanted to dive as deep as possible. 'He's got us,' he said in a voice which made some of the men shiver. Then the first depth charges exploded around them, and within seconds, the calm and orderly U‑boat interior was transformed. 

The explosion of the depth charges jarred the U‑boat, and all the men who were lying in their bunks found themselves pitched unceremoniously onto the floor. At the same time there was a terrifying bang, louder than anything any of the men had ever heard before. It stunned and deafened them, and they found themselves staring up at the U‑boat ceiling, as if by doing so they might be able to tell whether more depth charges were about to rain down on top of them. No one panicked. However one of the more experienced officers turned to Max Schiller, who at eighteen was the youngest man on board, and said, 'Come here, Schiller. Can you sit down beside me. I'm a married man. I've got children to think about. It would help me if you could keep me company.' Schiller obliged, grateful that he could calm himself by bringing comfort to someone else. The danger was underlined by the order to put on escape apparatus. All the men had been shown during their training how to escape from a sinking submarine. They had practised in a specially constructed tank. But they found themselves wondering whether they would survive long enough to escape. Or would they just feel one final terrifying explosion before all their faculties were switched off? 

Shortly after the first explosions the U‑boat hit the sea bed. But that only worsened their situation. The depth meter was showing that they had come to a stop paltry thirty‑six metres beneath the surface. As Dresky took stock in the control room, reports were coming in from fore and aft. One of the motors would not work, the lights were out, so the crew was having to make do with the dimmer emergency lighting, and many of the instruments were broken. Most ominously of all, water was beginning to trickle into the boat. 

At first Dresky allowed the U‑boat to remain on the sea bed. But between 4 and 5 a.m. two more batches of depth charges exploded around them. At this point Dresky asked Schilling what action they could take. Schilling at first recommended that they should attempt to slip away under the water. But when he attempted to move the U‑boat, using subtle applications of pressurised air to remove some of the water inside the diving tanks, he found that it was stuck on the sea bed. He eventually came to the conclusion that the only way out was to blow all the water out of the tanks, a manoeuvre which he hoped would take the U‑33 up to the surface. However he scoffed at the helmsman's view that they should then immediately abandon ship in order to save the crew's lives. Schilling still hoped that they would be able to creep away without being seen by the British warship. Dresky agreed, but it was at this point that their views began to diverge. Dresky's agreement was half-hearted. He was very pessimistic about their chances of escaping, given that they were still in British waters with dawn just hours away. 

If only Dresky had been able to track what was happening on GLEANER, it might have influenced what happened next. The third pattern of depth charges had put GLEANER'S asdic gear out of action. That being the case, the U‑33 could have surfaced, and then submerged again immediately. Once it was moving freely under the water, it could have slipped away without the British being able to seek it out with its probing sonar beams. Such evasive action would only have been sensible, however, if there was enough pressurised air inside the U‑boat to bring it to the surface for a second time after it had escaped. Schilling believed that there was enough for this manoeuvre. 

At 5.22 a.m. Schilling gave the order for the U‑33's tanks to be blown, and it began to ascend towards the surface. As the conning tower appeared above the waves the hatch was thrown open. Before giving the command to abandon ship, Dresky could have consulted with Schilling one more time to see if there was a chance that the U‑boat could have carried them out of trouble above or below the water line. Schilling says that he tried to discuss what could be done with Dresky, but he gave up when he realised that the order to abandon ship had already been given. While he was speaking to Dresky, men were already clambering up the conning tower so that they could leap down into the sea. 

At the same time as commanding everyone to abandon ship, Dresky also told his engineers to set the fuses for the explosives which had already been placed around the interior of the U-boat. However the fuses were hastily extinguished after one of the engineers realised that they would go off before all the crew were out of the boat. In the struggle to evacuate the U‑boat, the fact that the fuses had been extinguished, and new fuses lit, appears not to have been mentioned to Schilling. That would explain why, when the explosives failed to go off quickly, first Schilling and then Dresky climbed back down the conning tower in a desperate, and heroic, attempt to ensure not only that the fuses were lit, but also that as many vents and hatches as possible were opened. They met up once again at the top of the conning tower, whereupon Dresky asked Schilling to go below once again to see if something could be done to make the U‑33 sink more quickly. Schilling was about to refuse, when a wall of flame swept up the conning tower, and he felt a sharp blow on his left shoulder. At first he thought that he had been hit by a shell fired by GLEANER. Only later did he discover that it was the conning tower ladder which had struck him as the force of the explosion lifted it bodily out of the tower. 

After the explosives went off, the gallant Dresky, who had lost the mouthpiece attached to his life jacket in the explosion, and the equally courageous Schilling jumped into the freezing water to join the other members of the crew who were still waiting to be picked up by the circling British ship. As the U-boat sank, Dresky called out to his men to give three cheers for the U‑33. For many of the crew who were swimming around him, it was the last time they saw him alive. 

But that was not the end of the story. The final act in the drama had yet to be played out, an act which revolved around the Enigma cipher machine wheels. These were put in the pockets of certain members of the U‑33's crew who were supposed to drop them into the sea once they were clear of the Uboat. According to one survivor, two of the men did as they were told. Their wheels were lost forever on the Firth of Clyde sea bed. But the third man, Friedrich Kumpf, failed to comply with the instructions. After he was rescued and transferred to GLEANER, he is said to have turned to Heinz Rottmann, one of the surviving officers, and said, 'Herr Oberleutnant, I forgot to throw the wheels away.' Whereupon Rottmann walked over to where Kumpf's trousers were hanging and found that the pockets were empty. This was how Rottmann was said to have found out that the British had the wheels.' 

This story, dramatic as it is, cannot easily be squared with the testimony of Max Schiller who is still living in Scotland. Schiller, as well as being the youngest man on the U‑boat, was also one of the fittest. He was a member of the German Navy's water polo team. So he was one of the best swimmers and turned out to be one of the most resilient when it came to surviving for a long time in the icy water. After he was picked up by the Bohemian Queen, a passing trawler, he was the only survivor who was able to help the other crew members as they were hauled aboard. Schiller was present when Kumpf was lifted onto the trawler's deck, and it was Schiller who undressed Kumpf, as far as he remembers, before the British had any chance to search Kumpf's pockets. At the time Kumpf was conscious, but he was not in control of himself. The other survivors huddled for warmth around a stove in an attempt to restore the circulation to their freezing bodies. But Kumpf attempted to throw himself onto the stove itself in the mistaken belief that this would enable to him to escape from the appalling cold. Schiller only managed to save him by seizing him, and by bundling him into a cupboard which he then locked. Later all the crew, including a shivering Kumpf, were transferred to GLEANER. 

Schiller's account calls into question the veracity of the story about Rottmann and Kumpf's trousers. If Schiller really was with Kumpf from the moment Kumpf was pulled out of the sea until he was undressed, and if Schiller is correct in saying that he would have noticed if there was anything heavy in Kumpf's pockets, it is hard to see when the British could have found Kumpf's Enigma wheels. What is clear is that three wheels including two wheels which were only being used by the Navy were discovered and brought to the attention of Hugh Price, Cleaner's commander. The person who gave them to Price obviously did not have much experience with ciphering machines, for he later told one of his comrades that what he had handed over 'looked like the gear wheel off a bicycle'. 

This was a fine and most important success and Adolph Hitler was subsequently assured by the German C‑in‑C, Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder, that such a dangerous attempt would not be repeated. 

  Hitler, Doenitz and Dresky

In March 1940 GLEANER was sent back to W. Approaches Command in the 3rd A/S Flotilla, and she continued for the time being in her escort role.

6.3.40

Belfast

11.3.40

For Lamlash

10.4.40

Belfast

16.4.40

28.4.40

Scapa

28.4.40

2.5.40

Scapa

3.5.40

Escorting with Jason

5.5.40

Clyde

?

14/5 From N O i/c Ardrossan: Rendezvous with Electra, Ilex and Cowry(?), escort them to Cumbrae and return to Lamlash prior to proceeding on patrol

17.5.40

Belfast

23.5.40

For boiler cleaning

6.6.40

On 6 June she hastened to the assistance of the AMC CARINTHIA, torpedoed in 53.13N, 10.40W; the next day she stood by the ss EROS, beached with a valuable cargo on Tory Island (NW Ireland).

Lamlash

?

7/6 From GLEANER: 282 Officers and men evacuated from Carinthia. Should the weather continue favourably it is considered that there is a 50% possibility of salvage. I have slipped. Marauder now towing

9.6.40

Clyde

?

19.6.40

Thereafter GLEANER gained considerable experience in U‑boat hunting and attacking ... on 19 June she investigated two U‑boat sightings in the North Channel. Eight days later she left Greenock (her base at that time) with the 'Hunt' Class destroyers ATHERSTONE and FERNIE to hunt more U‑boats in the North Channel.

Source: Fred Bailey http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/87/a3799687.shtml

28.6.40

Belfast

?

In July the searching and attacking continued, her companions from time to time being JASON, NORTHERN GEM and the destroyer HURRICANE.

?

Scapa

17.7.40

15/8 From C in C Western Approaches: GLEANER joined Northern Escort Force

Source: http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.1937

Between 14 August and 27 October GLEANER escorted Convoys 0A198, SL42, 0A204, 0A216, OG43 and HG45.

GLEANER continued with anti-submarine duties until 12 August 1940 when she was detailed to relieve HMS Deptford as close escort to convoy OA198 off the west coast of Scotland, becoming a member of the Northern Escort Force. At 1420 on 16 August the escort aircraft reported having attacked and possible damaged a U-boat 180nm NW of Bloody Foreland. In a later report this aircraft claimed two direct hits by depth charges, the first blowing the U-boat to the surface with her decks awash. After the second, the U-boat heeled over on it's side and sank. GLEANER was brought to the spot at 1630 where she carried out a sweep and at 1710 she signalled the aircraft she could not get a contact. German records have shown this to be U51. She was not sunk, as thought, but had suffered extensive damage to her machinery. Limping on the surface towards Lorient, she was attacked and sunk by HMS Cachalot on 20 August.

GLEANER's second convoy, OA204, was not so fortunate. The convoy consisted of 21 ships in 6 columns, protected by GLEANER and Clematis. At 2335 on 28 August 1940, the SS Hartismere was struck by a torpedo on the starboard side, underneath the bridge. One minute later the Commodore's ship, the SS Dalblair, was torpedoed amidships on her starboard side and sank in ten minutes. GLEANER sighted explosions and tried to cross ahead of the convoy, narrowly avoiding several collisions with ships which, without a Commodore and without any orders were scattering in all directions at full speed. Hampered by her lack of speed the GLEANER turned back to ensure the survivors were being picked up. AT 0045 on 29 August the SS Astra II, from the convoy, was torpedoed and sunk rapidly. GLEANER picked up 18 survivors and at daylight proceeded to escort the damaged Hartismere to the Clyde. Two other ships from the convoy were lost.

22.8.40

Rosyth

25.8.40

31.8.40

Greenock

?

31/8 From F O i/c Greenock: GLEANER escorting torpedoed Hartsmere. GLEANER has 21 survivors

2.9.40

GLEANER, with ENGLISHMAN, attempted to help the THORNLEA, torpedoed in 55.41N, 14.3OW.

5.9.40

While off Cape Wrath on 5 Sept, defective boilers caused GLEANER to make for Rosyth where she spent a week under repair.

7.9.40

Rosyth

16.9.40

Taken in hand 10/9 Renewal of five row tubes (at 24 hours notice) Completes 13/9

GLEANER took Convoy OG43 down to Gibraltar in Sept/October, and then went out to escort OG44 on the last leg of its passage, giving four enemy destroyers out of Brest a wide berth.

3.10.40

Gibraltar

9.10.40

21/10 From C in C W A: Propose if C in C Rosyth concurs to transfer GLEANER to his command on completion of present duties

26.10.40

Greenock

5.11.40

In November she rescued survivors of the HARBOROUGH (from WN21 on the NE coast) who had been bombed, and she then escorted the East Coast convoys EN27, WN40, EN30, EN37 and WN50 before entering refit at Leith on 12 December.

5.11.40

From: The Commanding Officer, HMS GLEANER

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

GLEANER- 5^TH TO 7^TH NOVEMBER 1940, INCLUDING AIR ATTACK ON CONVOY 

1. On Tuesday 5^th November I was at Greenock where I had been since pm Saturday 26^th October. Whilst at Greenock Ship was docked at Messrs Scott's Dock and bottom scraped and coated. D G equipment was repaired and wooden troughing enclosing it renewed as necessary. A burnt out armature of turbo-generator was also replaced by spare carried on board.
    
2. I cast off from Western arm of Albert Dock at 0830 on 5^th November and proceeded to re-range at Helensborough D G Range. On completion, at 1030, I closed Signal Station and requested permission to proceed before adjusting compasses as visibility was too bad for this to be undertaken. Approval was received at 1120 and I proceeded, passed the boom at 1200. 13 knots for Rosyth. At 0500 6^th November, I passed through Trodday Passage and, at 0857, commenced to reduce speed as a choppy sea was encountered and I expected worse off Cape Wrath. Cape Wrath was rounded at noon on 6^th November and I reported to F O i/c Orkneys, visually via Cape Wrath War Signal Station, that I was passing Cape Wrath eastwards and using the Pentland Firth.
    
3. At 1235, 6^th November the D G current failed and on examination it was found that a cover board had carried away from wooden external troughing on the port side, that leads was hanging in the water in a bight and that some were broken. I reported this fact to Captain (D) Rosyth.
    
4. Duncansby Head was passed at 1700, GLEANER then being about 2 miles ahead of the leading ships of W.N.Convoy, (Senior Officer in Blackfly) and passing head of E.N.Convoy which was entering Pentland Firth. A short line of soundings was run in accordance with Hydrographer’s H12104/40 of 9^th October, but had to be abandoned on account of keeping clear of convoy and escort, and, later, because of the failing light.
    
5. At 1824 a large explosion took place astern and gunfire was heard, flashes seen and signal received “Help W.N. Convoy PCMA 3708”. At 1826, I altered course to the northward and increased to 15 knots to close and assist in defence of convoy, several of whose ships were firing at enemy aircraft.

At 1845, when close to a vessel on fire (which turned out to be the Clan Mackinley), an enemy aircraft attacked at high speed from astern, passing very close along starboard side and banking steeply across bows, dropping a bomb close on the port bow, which obtained a hit on S.S. Harborough. GLEANER opened fire with 0.5” MG, Lewis Gun and 4”HA on sight and as soon as the guns could be got to bear but attack was so sudden and so rapidly carried out that few rounds were fired – only 3 rounds were fired by 4” guns and no hits were observed.  Aircraft was burning navigation lights and looked like an H.E. 111K. It is thought that she glided in to close astern before opening up the throttle. GLEANER was at action stations at the time of attack. Aircraft did not machine gun GLEANER though she was in a good position to do so. It is possible she had not seen us. Harborough states that she was gunned.

6. After circling Harborough several times to guard against another attack, whilst I thought crew were dealing with fire, I went to her assistance in position 076˚ Noss Head distant 9 miles. She was burning fiercely in cross bunker and on bridge. (Croww bunker used for stowage of grain) The slight swell prevailing prevented me getting alongside to use ship’s fire hoses. Crew abandoned ship at about 1900 and, at 1933, I picked up 29 survivors (including the Captain and 5 officers), from one lifeboat. Another boat was found with no one onboard but the third boat was not seen although I made a careful search assisted by the Wick Lifeboat.
    
7. Meanwhile preparations were made onboard GLEANER to take Harborough in tow, though it was reported by her master that she was sinking slowly by the head. Fire had obtained a good grip forward of the funnel and it was not found possible to get on board the forecastle. After 1900 no sign was seen of Clan Mackinley and it was presumed that she had sunk and at 2100 Blackfly reported that she had survivors on board. A large patch of oil was seen in the vicinity of where she was last sighted.
    
8. At 2030 it appeared to me that Harborough would float for some time and that it would be possible to beach her, to which opinion her Master agreed and I reported the fact to ACOS and C in C Rosyth. Boarding party from GLEANER in charge of my First Lieutenant, Lieut E P Reade, DSC. Got on board her at 2150, abaft the funnel and started to clear away a 4 ½ inch wire stowed on a reel on the poop. However, Tug Buccaneer arrived at 2200, her tow was secured by boarding party, and she took Harborough in tow, stern first, setting course for Kirkwall. I requested instructions from ACOS as to where she should be taken and as to whether I should remain as escort. Tug Bandit arrived at 2330, together with another Tug whose identity was not established. At 0055/7 I received orders from ACOS to tell tug to tow her to Scapa and to report expected time of arrival at Hoxa Gate. After passing orders I was to proceed in execution of previous orders.
    
9. The report of the boarding party of Harborough's state on boarding was that from forward of the funnel she was ablaze in cross-bunker, that bridge was burnt out, a large hole was in deck on starboard side of deck and side plating just forward of the funnel and that side plating was cracked for a distance of about 5 to 6 feet downwards from the bottom of the hole mentioned above. It was possible that fire was spreading to No.2 hold, and such was the opinion of Master and Chief Officer, but this was not corroborated by my First Lieutenant.

It appears probable that if a certain amount of panic had not taken place aboard immediately after the attack, when the crew took to the boats, that the fire might have been got under control with the ordinary fire fighting appliances on board. The idea of being a sitting and brightly lit target would appear to have been uppermost in the minds of the crew. A pessimistic view of her condition was given me in the first place and on that view I based my actions. It is understood that she has been safely towed to port (beached at Kirkwall).   

Hugh Price

Lieut Commander in Command 

18^th November 1940 

From: Commander in Chief, Plymouth,

1.   Forwarded for the information of Their Lordships 

2.   I consider that credit is due to the Commanding Officer of HMS GLEANER, Lieutenant Commander H P Price, DSO and to Lieutenant E P Reade, DSC, the Officer in Charge of the Boarding Party, by whose initiative and actions the SS Harborough was recovered and taken in tow back to Scapa.

 23^rd December 1940

 To Commander in Chief, Western Approaches

(Copy to Commanding Officer HMS GLEANER)

 I am to acquaint you that Their Lordships have read with pleasure the report contained in your submission of 18^th November of the good service of the Commanding Officer, HMS GLEANER and Lieutenant E P Reade, DSC, by whose initiative and actions the SS Harborough was recovered and taken in tow to Scapa; and I am to convey to them an expression of Their Lordships’ appreciation.

                        BY COMMAND OF THEIR LORDSHIPS

7.11.40

Rosyth

11.11.40

14.11.40

Position 352˚ Kinnaird Head 11 miles

Course 146˚ Speed 7 ½ knots

Weather: Vis 6 (4 miles), cloud Cu-Nb & St 9/10. Cloud base 1000ft. 

At 1739 BST, one seaplane was sighted bearing Red 90˚, closing with an inclination of 130˚ to the right, obviously hostile, and flying about 100ft above the sea. GLEANER opened fire with foremost 4”, Lewis Gun and 0.5” M.G. and aircraft banked steeply, turning to port and made off to seaward and southward. She had actually penetrated the 4” barrage before turning.

Escorting Blenheim, which was flying at a height of about 400 feet, crossed over this seaplane at the moment of explosion of second shell and obviously did not see the seaplane. At 1746, seaplane made another attack from the same quarter in a similar manner. Rapid barrage fire was opened with the whole of the armament and aircraft again banked and made off to the eastward. On this occasion she did not penetrate the 4”barrage. It is considered possible that she may have received some slight damage from the 0.5”fire, which appeared good. Escorting Blenheim approached from North and passed over ship a second or two after seaplane had turned away. Blenheim then disappeared and it is not known if she went in pursuit.

Seaplane appeared to be a D.O. 22 Reconnaissance-Torpedo-Bomber. No torpedoes or bombs were dropped. No further attacks developed.

Previous to the attacks, at 1736, one aircraft was sighted bearing Red 90˚, range 10,000 yards, low on horizon flying NW'ly. I tried to attract escorting Blenheim's attention to it without success. Aircraft was only in sight for about 30 seconds. Convoy consisted of 4 ships, three of whom were in line abreast whilst the fourth was about 1 mile astern of them. GLEANER was stationed abreast this straggler on port quarter of convoy.

H Price Lieutenant Commander in Command

15.11.40

Rosyth

16.11.40

20.11.40

Rosyth

22.11.40

25.11.40

Rosyth

26.11.40

1.12.40

Rosyth

6.12.40

?

Scapa

7.12.40

8.12.40

Scapa

9.12.40

10.12.40

Rosyth

12.12.40

12.12.40

Leith

?

16/12 From A S Rosyth; Completes 31/1 ex trials